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This article is set to discuss the various techniques that can be used while 
developing a honeypot, of any form, while considering the advantages and 
disadvantages of these very different methods. The foremost aims are to 
cover the principles of the Secure Shell (SSH), how it can be useful and more 
importantly, how attackers can gain access to a system by using it. The article 
involved the development of multiple low interaction honeypots. The low 
interaction honeypots that have been developed make use of the highly 
documented libssh and even editing the source code of an already available 
SSH daemon. Finally the aim is to combine the results with the vastly 
distributed Kippo honeypot, in order to be able to compare and contrast the 
results along with usability and necessity of particular features. Providing a 
clean and simple description for less knowledgeable users to be able to 
create and deploy a honeypot of production quality, adding security 






There has been a variety of honeypots previously developed to work using the 
SSH protocol. The aim of this article is not to build software that can better 
these is every way, but more of a focus on a quick, simple, yet effective 
alternative to the pre-built packages available as well as providing a piece of 
software that can be available to professionals and unenlightened server 
users en masse. 
 
A honeypot is a wittingly vulnerable piece of software or system that is often 
used to emulate a service, system or network. The advantages of honeypots 
are that they are intentionally exposed in particular ways. The ruse and 
falsification used in honeypots is to hopefully entice attackers, which can be 
harder than it may seem as most attackers with some sort of knowledge, not a 
‘script kiddie’, will soon realise that they are not in a real system when they try 
to run certain commands or processes that the honeypot doesn’t understand. 
The results from different types of honeypots often vary significantly in depth, 
which will be further discussed in the results section of this document. 
(Spitzner (2002)) states that, a honeypot should be available to be attacked, 
as a security resource it has no value or purpose when it is not probed, 
attacked or compromised. The results that are produced from honeypots can 
cause vast improvements in computer security, including but not limited to; 
improved Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), Intrusion Prevention Systems 
(IPS) and Anti-Virus software. However, arguably the most important feature 
is that, when emulating a particular service or system, the honeypot is 
configured exactly the same as the regular services running on the system. 
The reason for this is that if an attacker succeeds at breaking into the 
honeypot with the same configuration it is very likely that the actual service 
could be compromised and is in need of some extra protection (Jonsson et al 
(2004)). 
 
There are two main categories of honeypot that this article is concerned with 
and they are often used to gather very different information about the attacker. 
Low interaction honeypots, which can be referred to as facades, are much 
simpler to build and maintain, as they tend to be a simulation of a particular 
service, such as SSH (HKSAR (2008)). Low interaction honeypots have been 
favoured by the industry due to the simplicity and ease to set up and collect 
meaningful results (Provos et al (2008)). The limitations involved with these 
particular honeypots are vast as they only emulate a specific service and 
often will have no system beyond that particular service. Although they have 
their limitations, these types of honeypots have been the most prolific in 
recent years due to these limitations. The reason for this is that the user of 
this type of honeypot will be able to collect and analyse data that is only 
relevant to the service they are concerned with, which can give a much 
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deeper understanding of the techniques and patterns that attackers tend to 
follow. 
 
High interaction honeypots are what most people would consider as a typical 
honeypot. They provide a fully functioning system that will allow the attacker 
to interact with the system on all levels. Quite simply a high interaction 
honeypot can be any vulnerable system that is connected to a network and 
can be monitored for analysis. (Semantic (2008)) describe these as truly 
vulnerable systems that can be probed, attacked and exploited, once the 
attacker gains access to the system the honeypot can be used in a botnet or 
to carry out other attacks. This gives light to some ethical issues with regard 
to continuing the research once a honeypot has been compromised, when 
should the system be taken back from the attacker and should it really be 
used in the type of attacks that it has been designed to prevent? It is for this 
reason that they take a lot of maintaining and will also need a system such as 
Honeywall, a gateway service monitoring all traffic, in order to complete a full 
forensic investigation. The example used throughout this article has been 
Kippo, which was deployed for this project. Other than interaction levels, 
honeypots can be classified in other ways such as; usage, virtual or physical. 
 
Honeypots can take many forms and this means that they are regularly 
deployed in very different circumstances and positions within networks. They 
must also take into account the complexity of what they are researching, for 
example certain pieces of malware will not act in a malicious way when it finds 
itself in a virtual environment, this is obviously because the more we are 
allowed to research the methods that attackers use the more they must 
evolve in order to maintain the allusive nature and evade detection 
(Zakorzhevsky (2010)). One of these methods is the minefield deployment 
system; this method will have a honeypot which is placed within the same 
subnet as a number of servers giving a better chance that the attacker will 
alert the honeypot if trying to breach a server on that system. It is well known 
that most attacks will scan an entire network or range of addresses and 
honeypots within this range will notice this scan, even if they use tools slowing 
down the scans to try and prevent the IDS from being alerted (Jonsson et al 
(2004)). Other mechanisms of deployment include a Honeynet 
(https://www.honeynet.org/about), this is a method of deploying an entire 
network of honeypots, which individually can collect information about 
particular services and as a whole can provide details on what is most likely to 
be attacked and whether the attacker will attempt to sit in the network 






Amazon Web Service 
 
The hosting of this article was done on the Amazon Web Service(AWS). AWS 
provides a number of services but the Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) is the 
web service which was used. EC2 provides resizable compute capacity in the 
cloud. It is designed to make web-scale cloud computing easier for 
developers and it is very useful for deploying honeypots. A main benefit of the 
AWS is that with its elastic computing it allows the volumes of instances to be 
attached, detached and reattached to instances. Being able to detach and 
reattach a volume may seem unnecessary but should the user become locked 
out of an instance, because of configuration modification, the whole server is 
not lost. One of the main issues surrounding honeypots is that if they are not 
attacked they are of no use (Spitzner (2003)). The AWS, being part of one of 
the largest companies in the world, has a very high amount of traffic through 
its web servers and attackers know the range of IP addresses, making it much 
more likely that they honeypot will be able to collect an adequate amount of 
data. The AWS allows the user to select a particular region for where their 
cloud servers are deployed, putting it in a different bracket of IP addresses, 
which could give massively different results. The SmartHoney article has used 
AWS for running all manner of honeypots, focused on various services, one in 
particular is SSH where they found that placing their honeypots in certain 
regions meant a significant variation in the volume of these attacks 
(https://blog.smarthoneypot.com/tag/aws/). Considering the use of AWS has 
been very beneficial to much larger and full time honeypot projects; 
SmartHoney, Secure Honey it seems that it should more than suffice for a 




The SSH protocol is designed to give the user a secure method of connecting 
to a system, to login or use the other services on a system, over an insecure 
network. (Ylonen et al (2006)).  The SSH protocol uses a three step process 
in order to create the secure session; these steps are as follows, SSH 
transport layer, SSH user authentication and SSH connect. These steps are in 
fact sub-protocols that run on top of the previous sub-protocol respectively to 
create the SSH tunnel. 
 
The transport layer is the first sub-protocol when creating an SSH session, 
using TCP/IP to connect to port 22 of the server in order to provide 
authentication of the server and the key exchange. After the initial connect 
message there is a protocol-identification so that both parties are using the 
same protocol, SSH version 2 for example. The key exchange algorithm is 
then negotiated between the client and server and then the key exchange 
itself takes place using the agreed algorithm. (Poll et al (2011)). 
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The user authentication process is the server confirming the identity of the 
user attempting to gain access. This can involve various methods, but must 
always include the public key authentication. (Ylonen et al (2006)).  This is a 
check between the server and the client that the respective public and private 
keys are owned as this is used to encrypt the messages. Public key 
encryption uses two mathematically related keys, public and private, in order 
to encrypt and decrypt data. The private key is secret and only the owner 
should know it, whereas the public key is made readily available. Anything 
encrypted using the public key can only be decrypted using the corresponding 
private key and visa versa. (Comodo. (2015)). Although this is the most 
secure method of authentication it is not always enabled and can sometimes 
be bypassed if the server will accept password authentication instead. 
 
The final sub-protocol is the SSH connect, which runs on top of SSH transport 
layer and SSH user authentication. This sub-protocol is used to create 
channels used for data transfer, where each terminal session, forwarded 
connection, etc, are separate channels that are multiplexed into a single 
connection. It can provide channels for login sessions, TCP/IP connections 
and allows remote command execution along with file transfer using SFTP. 
(Ylonen et al (2006)). SFTP is not to be confused with FTPS, many things 
have changed since the introduction of protocols such as FTP and sending 
data over any public network without a form of encryption is considered very 
dangerous and in some cases prohibited. Regulations like PCI-DSS and 
HIPAA, for example, contain provisions that require data transmissions to be 
protected by encryption. When regulations such as these were initially 
discussed it was obvious for the need of a secure way to transfer files, which 
gave light to the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) being used on top of FTP to 
create FTPS. The issue with this is that it requires a minimum of two 
channels, one for the initial connection and subsequent commands and one 
for and data transfer, which causes a higher risk of a security breach as there 
must be a range of open ports on each system. SSL also does not offer any 
authentication per se as any certificates used can be self signed, therefore 
this is not an efficient method to determine the authenticity of any persons or 
servers that are being communicated with. Whereas SFTP uses only one 
channel as previously discussed to tunnel all information through. SSH is 
more specifically for remote login and has almost completely replaced Telnet 








Brute Force Attacks 
 
The most common form of initial attack involving SSH is brute force and in 
fact it is the most prolicfic form of attack against Internet facing servers, 
(Owens 2008; The SANS Institute 2007). The concept of a brute force attempt 
is simple; try every possible value until authentication has been achieved. The 
issue with using brute force is that given a 5 character password, where only 
letters that are of the same case are used, it could take 265 guesses 
(11,881,376). Given that the majority of passwords contain more letters and/or 
use numbers or special characters, the amount of time taken to gain entry 
could easily surpass the attackers lifespan. In order to speed up this process 
and make it worthwhile for an attacker they will often use large lists of 
common passwords, called dictionaries. Dictionary attacks can be significantly 
much more efficient than brute force attacks because they are not 
sequentially trying password combinations but rather, known common 
passwords that are widely used. By default most SSH servers will have a limit 
to the number of authentication attempts that can be tried per connection, but 
as with many things involving connectivity it can be bypassed by the attacker, 
if the correct configuration is not it place, quite simply by adding an extra 
parameter to the initial connection command: 
 
ssh -lusername -oKbdInteractiveDevices=`perl -e 'print "pam," 
x 10000'` targethost 
 
The above command would allow the attacker up to 10000 password attempts 
before the connection is refused, which obviously is very useful while 
undergoing a brute force attack. (http://arstechnica.co.uk/security). 
 
Building and Deploying 
 
The aforementioned low interaction honeypots developed have been written 
in the C language, this is because there is a large amount of documentation 
involving available libraries, such as libssh, functions and source code that 
are readily available for inspiration and utilisation. 
 
There are many different ways to go about creating a low interaction honeypot 
of production standard, but with the aim of being simple to use and develop 
while maintaining the effectiveness of result gathering it can be a difficult trade 
off. The first method that was used was similar to many projects that already 
exist using the C SSH library, libssh, to employ the fuctions of the SSH 
protocol. 
 
While conducting initial research about the SSH protocol and involved 
honeypot projects, there were quite a few production honeypots that are 
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available and as most of these are open source projects the source code can 
be easily attained and edited to improve or configure on the users specific 
system. The most notable of these actually used the libssh for C was the 
SecureHoney project, which had modified a honeypot that has been 
previously written by another developer. This type of method to produce a 
honeypot is useful and most of all safe for the user to run, the reason for this 
is that the connection is never actually authenticated. The program uses the 
functions in the libssh library in order to listen for connections and begin the 
authentication process. The information gathered about the attacker is written 
into a file for later analysis. Issues with this is that an attacker with the know-
how will realise that this is not an SSH daemon because information regarding 
the SSH can be collected while scanning and interrogating before attempting 
an attack. Given this information it was evident that, while this was exactly the 
type of honeypot that was to be produced during this project, an alternative to 
this could provide arguably better results with substantially less programming 
and development. 
 
The alternative idea however does not emulate the SSH daemon, because it 
was created by editing the source code of by far the most prolific SSH 
daemon in use, OpenSSH. OpenSSH was originally part of the OpenBSD 
suite. Considering that in 2008 OpenSSH had 88% of the market share and in 
October 2015 announced that it will be natively supported on windows 
(Microsoft, (2015)). The advantages of this are that the honeypot will be, to all 
intents and purposes, an actual version of the OpenSSH daemon. This means 
that an attacker is much less likely to be susceptible to suspicion when 
attempting to brute force the system. 
 
Although this seems like a honeypot in the loosest of senses, it can be very 
beneficial as a production honeypot. As the software can be configured to 
provide an output very similar to that in the SecureHoney project, including 
creating specific files for logging attempts and even collecting IP addresses of 
the attackers. There are many problems that can occur when attempting to 
use this method, as the source code for the daemon is being edited and 
recompiled, including making it difficult to actually use the SSH service for 
anything other than they honeypot, which can be devastating if this is being 




Honeypot in C 
The first step to this process was becoming familiar with the libssh and the 
functions that were imperative to creating a valid SSH session that we would 
need as a basis for the honeypot. These functions are an example of how the 
libssh functions can be used to set up the standard configuration of a new 
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SSH session, which include; 
 
static ssh_session session; 
static ssh_bind sshbind; 
session=ssh_new(); 
ssh_options_set(session, ssh_options_timeout, &timeout)    
sshbind=ssh_bind_new(); 
ssh_bind_options_set(sshbind, ssh_bind_options_banner, "ssh \r\n"); 
ssh_bind_options_set(sshbind, ssh_bind_options_bindaddr, listenaddress); 
ssh_bind_options_set(sshbind, ssh_bind_options_bindport, &port); 
ssh_bind_options_set(sshbind, ssh_bind_options_hostkey, "ssh-rsa");    
ssh_bind_options_set(sshbind, ssh_bind_options_rsakey,rsa_keyfile); 
 
The next step after making sure that the session has been set up and is 
listening on the desired port we must be able to accept incoming connections 
and drop them after the user authentication credentials that the attacker used 
have been logged and placed in a file called ssh_attemps. This forms the 
basis of the honeypot and used sections of an SSH honeypot that was found 
at as it fulfills the task of collecting the password attempts. 
 
Modification of OpenSSH 
 
This section is to describe exactly how the daemon can be modified to create 
a honeypot that is easy to maintain with little coding, although this can all be 
bypassed entirely by simply running the script that has been developed to 
automate the process. The automation of this via a script makes this method 
more efficient than developing a honeypot in C, having said this, the 
OpenSSH source files are written in C and manual editing of this would need 
some level of knowledge regarding programming in C. 
 
This method has been separated into two separate methods, this is because 
there is an instance where both methods could be doubled together in order 
to gather much more information from a selection of servers. 
 
The first way of doing this is to simply modify the source code of the daemon. 
By doing this no SSH connection attempt will be authorised, the attackers IP 
address along with the username and password that was attempted, and 





The most important part of this code is the return 0; segment, which is within 
the password authentication file in the source code. This line means that no 
matter what is entered by the attacker the authentication will always result in a 
failure. The problem with this method is that by doing this, the sshd is 
rendered useless for any sessions that the user may need in future without 
reverting the modifications. 
 
The second method when editing source code requires a little more setting up 
and involves a second instance of the SSH daemon. The reason for this is 
that having the service running twice as two separate services allows different 
configuration for each daemon, therefore one should be configured as the 
façade daemon and one should be configure as a usable service. The usable 
service should be placed on a large port number preferably between 10000 
and 65535 and designed with usual SSH security.  
 
Finally, using a combination of both daemon modification methods a network 
of servers could each run multiple SSH daemons. Unlike the previous method 
though, this method has two fully functional daemons, one of which can be 
used by the user for their normal SSH activity and the other uses the 
ForceCommand in the sshd_config file. This will force all connections that are 
attempted on this daemon, to a central server that is running the 
aforementioned modified daemon that accepts no connections and logs all 




While running various honeypots, that have been partially developed or 
modified for the purposes of this project, the medium-interaction production 
honeypot Kippo was also deployed. The reason for initial deployment of this 
particular honeypot was to give a better understanding of the way that well 
known products, that are already available, record certain log attempts as well 
as the particular features that are available. This gives an insight into this type 
of technology available and provides an example of the reporting technique 
that’s used. Another reason that this honeypot was deployed was to see if all 
the functions that are available in Kippo are of any use. 
 
Interestingly the results of running this honeypot showed that large number of 
the attackers, once inside the honeypot, typed a single command and then 
exited. The command used wasn’t always the same but the response given 
by the system obviously prompted the attacker to leave. From this given 
information, it was deduced that the attackers knew they were within a 
honeypot. After experiencing this a little more research was conducted, via 
the SANS institute forums, and it would appear that this behavior could be a 
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number of things, but most likely that they had in fact realised the honeypot 
for what it is. Accessing the server that is running Kippo can show this, and 
running the command that plays out a particular connection live. 
$: ~/kippo/utils/playlog.py 20160316-100915-9940.log 
 
 
Another idea is that this is part of an automated brute force attack. When the 
target system has finally been compromised, the machine that is conducting 
the attack saves the last password guess and logs out so that the owner can 
browse the compromised machine at their convenience. Another notable point 
was the large amount of IP addresses that had attacked this honeypot were 
predominantly Chinese and South Korean based internet service providers. 
This was also the case with downloads, using wget command. The downloads 
were directed to servers with Chinese IP addresses, many of which had been 
blacklisted online by various sites that provide lists of malicious hosts and 
reports it to relevant bodies. (https://cymon.io/222.186.15.61) 
 
Kippo is a good tool but observation proves that fingerprinting may mean that 
by using a medium interaction honeypot such as this, we may not actually 
gain any better results than the low interaction SSH honeypots that never 
accept connections. Kippo can be difficult to use properly as a server admin 
with little experience of this type of technology, with more dependancies and 
longer set up time along with much more maintainence for sql databases, 
whereas a method that doesn’t bother with what an attacker might possibly do 
once inside and a purely keeping them out strategy could provide just as 
valuble information with ease. 
 
The idea was to use this as an inspiration in order to create something similar 
but more refined to my particular needs. It is for this reason that I used a 
similar recording approach in other methods for collecting the results. 
Although this honeypot has been successful with previous projects, it seemed 
to give a fair few problems when I attempted to run this on one of my AWS 
instances. Naturally there were some dependencies to install and some 
configuration of the honeypot that was necessary before it could be used. The 
issues faced with running this on an AWS instance were initially compatibility 
errors. Errors including being unable to install a fully functional version of 
OpenSSL, which is a dependency with all SSH services as the libraries are 
used, this was resolved by using a different AWS instance because the 
package could not be located and installing from source on the server did not 
compile. More problems followed this, once the honeypot could be compiled 
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and built it still wouldn’t run due to the program being unable to find the 
private key file. This took up a vast amount of time to resolve as all the 
configuration and code, to my knowledge, was correct. Although I had a lot of 
problems with this technique, I believe that from a development point of view it 
is by far the most powerful because it gives the developer free reign to create 
a honeypot to their choosing and functional requirements. On a final negative 
point, this technique should be used to create much more powerful projects 
and programs such as Kippo, when attempting to use such sophisticated 
techniques to emulate a daemon it makes no sense to limit the service by not 
implementing it into a medium to high interaction honeypot. 
 
When emulating a service is required it seems to be far more efficient to 
modify a daemon that already has an enormous market share. Modification, 
as can be seen in this project, can be just as useful as developing a honeypot 
from nothing, if not more so because of the time saving. The reason that the 
method of two SSH daemons was used is because it allows the most amount 
of modification if necessary, as it is the source code being modified. This also 
makes the honeypot instance of the daemon incredibly secure, as the 
password authentication will always fail regardless of what is entered by the 
attacker. However, this procedure also offered some difficulties, such as 
modifying the incorrect files or missing out very necessary steps in the 
process. The issues prompted a fair amount of time studying the man pages 
for various configuration files, along with researching the innumerable Linux 
forums for clarification on certain files, including their contents and location. 
Fortunately all attempts to create this method were conducted within a virtual 
machine, which prevented the implementer from being locked out of my AWS 
instances when restarting the SSH daemons. A solid understanding of the 
protocol, daemons, libraries and system files is necessary for developing any 







Although this article has seemingly concluded with a tool that offers very 
similar services to those that are already available, this is by no means the 
limit to what is possible. Further work would involve the creation of a bash 
script. This script could then be used by 3rd parties who wish to conduct this 
sort of research or as an easier option when waiting to launch an SSH 
honeypot. Other possible development opportunities could include making this 
honeypot more available as a production honeypot. As the software that has 
been modified is open source, the redistribution of modified versions of it is 
permitted under its license (St. Laurent, (2008)). Therefore it would not be 
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difficult to produce a script that automates the whole process, using wget to 
obtain the modified code. The benefit of this easy method of install means that 
it could easily be placed on a large group of servers. Speculatively speaking, 
this would give light to even further development, using the sshpot.com as 
stimulus. The group of servers that are running the modified daemons would 
send the results to a main hub of results, being able to produce statistics and 
security enhancements alike. A thought on how this would be achieved, would 
be running a chronjob that ran another script. This script would check the 
hash of the sshd_attempts file and forward the results if any new ones had 
been recorded. Alternatively, editing the sshd_config file once again could 
also do this. These new additions would include a Match Group User section 
added that forced all connections made, to the modified daemon, straight to 
the main server utilising the ForceCommand option. Rather than beginning 
with a complete new build that is a honeypot, use existing well developed and 
highly distributed tools in order to develop a instrument that could be used on 
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